Islam and Security in the West

Edited by Stefano Bonino · Roberta Ricucci



Islam and Security in the West

"A subject of enduring significance, examined here in comparative, multi-disciplinary and historically-minded manner. A fascinating and impressive book."

—Professor Richard English, author of *Does Terrorism Work? A History*

"Like H.G. Wells's *War of the Worlds*, Samuel Huntington's 1993 prediction of a *Class of Civilizations* mesmerized many with its suggestion of a coming vortex of cosmic conflict. And yet, in practice, the sheer complexity of Muslim experience in the West has not been reducible to academic soundbites, however elegantly phrased. By contrast, a key strength of *Islam and Security in the West* is its stubborn insistence on a close examination of the actual lived experience and grassroots perspectives of 'frontline' communities on the Western front of the (so-called) Global War on Terror. As the 21st Century continues its troubled evolution, this important collection of essays looks set to remain both timely and provocative."

—Dr. Tim Wilson, *Director, Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews*

"This is a rich collection of varying opinions on one of the most urgent and important issues facing Europe today: its relationship with the Muslim community. The diversity of expertise of the contributors means that while it is enriching it is also bound to intellectually stimulate, excite and agitate the reader. In short this is a major contribution to the thinking and concerned reader. A must read."

—Professor Akbar Ahmed, *Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, School of International Service, American University, Washington DC*

Stefano Bonino · Roberta Ricucci
Editors

Islam and Security in the West

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Stefano Bonino
Turin, Italy

Roberta Ricucci
Department of Culture, Politics and Society
University of Turin
Turin, Italy

ISBN 978-3-030-67924-8 ISBN 978-3-030-67925-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67925-5

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Introduction

The events of 11 September 2001 that opened the new millennium have received considerable attention from academics, journalists, politicians and experts. This attention has often materialized in 'here-and-now' analyses of the mutated and mutating relationships among Western societies, Muslim communities, democratic values and liberty. Nonetheless, there is no historically situated analysis of the relationship between Islam and security via an interdisciplinary lens that can combine diverse, and yet interrelated, perspectives from politics, sociology, international relations and security studies. This edited book pivots on the key idea that the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and their aftermath have led to the opening of a new phase in Western and European history and have remade the relationship between Islam and governmental and societal approaches to security. In a delicate political climate, in which the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent waves have enflamed the relationships between Muslim communities and the Western countries that host them, the current surge of populist parties and leaders in Europe and the United States has further complicated the relationships between Islam and the West. In this context, Islam and security are often studied in a polarized manner—one which juxtaposes the security issues emerging from certain interpretations of Islam, on the one hand, and the 'securitization' of Muslims, on the other hand.

Western societies have responded to the real threat posed by terrorism by both drafting useful counter-terrorism programs and also extending

their remit beyond the targeting of violent Islamists and by directing measures that have, wittingly or unwittingly, actually or perceivedly, impacted on larger sections of the Muslim community. Moreover, a neo-assimilationist approach has emerged among several scholars considering both first- and second-generation Muslims' integration. In this context, the role of Muslims and their associations in promoting a 'Western' and transnational Islam is still under-scrutinized. This edited book seeks to bridge these gaps by bringing together contributions from sociologists, political scientists, criminologists and security studies scholars in order to offer a sober, non-politicized analysis of the thorny relationship between Islam and security in the West. The contributions are case studies from across the Western world which, while they do not encompass every single country, can still provide a solid understanding of the mutated and mutating relationships between Islam and Islamism, on the one hand, and security and securitization, on the other hand.

Roberta Ricucci's Chapter 1 starts this book's exploration of the relationship between Islam and security by investigating religion within immigrant communities. She finds that religion could play a strong role in the lives of both first- and second-generation members. Her chapter intends to address an emerging field of study concerning the management of the Muslim diaspora at the local level and discusses several European cities' approaches (Barcelona, Turin, Amsterdam and Berlin) through interviews with stakeholders, policy-makers and religious associations' representatives, and field visits carried out in the last five years outlining their strengths and weaknesses in the perspective of policy transferability.

Chapter 2 is Besheer Mohamed, Kelsey Starr and Ariana Salazar's comparison of attitudes toward Muslims across the United States and Western Europe, keeping in mind the limitation that social desirability, or the proclivity of respondents to give survey answers that they think are more socially acceptable, may work differently in these two places. The chapter is based on surveys that asked non-Muslims in the United States and in 15 countries in Western Europe whether they would be willing to accept Muslims as (a) neighbors and (b) as family members.

Chapter 3 is Stefano Bonino's examination of the role played by Islamism in the contemporary world. The key argument is that political Islam holds the key to understanding current geopolitical tensions both *within* the Muslim world and *between* the West and the Muslim world. This chapter reviews key literature to explore some violent and non-violent manifestations of political Islam and offers analyses of the

Islamic State, al-Qa'eda, the Muslim Brotherhood and, more generally, Salafi-jihadism.

Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes's Chapter 4 examines the evolution of jihadist terrorism in the United States since the advent of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It evaluates the homegrown threat of ISIS in America across six key dynamics: (1) supporters who planned and/or conducted attacks in the United States, (2) supporters who traveled or attempted to travel to Syria and Iraq to join the group, (3) ISIS and its supporters in the online sphere, (4) major jihadist ideologues who spread ISIS' message to an American audience, (5) the financial aspects of American ISIS cases and (6) U.S. counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) programs.

In a similar fashion, Francesco Marone provides, in Chapter 5, an analysis of the evolution of the jihadist threat in Europe since 2014. It argues that jihadist mobilization in Europe is not a new phenomenon, however has witnessed a substantial increase in recent years, especially after the sudden rise of the Islamic State, which proclaimed its "Caliphate" on 29 June 2014. During this period, the jihadist threat in Europe has manifested in at least two main ways: the increase of terrorist attacks and plots, with a peak in 2017, and the unprecedented flow of foreign terrorist fighters heading to Syria, Iraq and other countries (of whom over 5000 from the region).

Chapter 6 is Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Kerry O'Brien, Peter Lentini and Greg Barton's exploration of alienation as an important risk factor for radicalization into violent extremism. Through three studies, it finds that the more alienated young Australians are, the more they tend to support violent extremism—controlling for other demographic and ideological factors. It also finds that the more alienated young Indonesian Muslims studying in Australia are, the more they respond to existential threats by preferring extremist views. Overall, extreme ideologies can offer an effective buffer against threat and anxiety for individuals who are more alienated and therefore less able to cope.

In Chapter 7, Roger Campdepadrós-Cullell and Lena De Botton present the Dialogical Model of Conflict Resolution, a Successful Educational Act (SEA) that incorporates the preventive socialization of the violence oriented to breaking with the coercive speech that associates attraction and violence, thus preventing violent radicalization. One of its results is the elaboration of a norm of coexistence by the entire educational community when a repeated conflict or a problem is detected.

Another one is the realization of actions linked to solidarity with the victims and to the rejection of aggressive attitudes by using both the language of desire and ethics.

Drawing on primary comparative data from Muslim communities and counter-extremism programs across European case studies, Richard McNeil-Willson's Chapter 8 finds that recent counterterrorism policy and discourse has been appropriated by several competing political actors. As such, it is important to reposition discussion on the impact of counterterrorism on Muslim communities in a way which accounts for their interaction with more polarized contemporary political arenas across Europe.

In Chapter 9, Tahir Abbas argues that both Islamophobia and radicalization are manifestations of intersections of *race*, *racism*, *racialism* and the *racialization* of Islam and Muslims in Britain today. That is, the othering of Muslim groups leads to patterns of discrimination based on their construction as the objectified other. Issues of exclusion lead to patterns of disadvantage that compound existing social tensions. The constant negative attention paid to Muslim groups creates the normalization of hate and disdain sustained by media and politics. This enhances existing exclusionary practices leading to entrenchment and normalization. In conclusion, it is argued that a greater understanding of these issues is essential to empower groups in society to resist the forces that seek to divide and cause Islamophobia to feed into radicalization and vice versa.

Khalid Rhazzali is the author of Chapter 10's reconstruction of the characteristics of the Muslim presence in Italian prisons, aiming at illustrating the current state of religious assistance and the role of the Muslim associations of the territory. The chapter also analyzes the effects induced on prison organization by negotiations between Muslim prisoners and the penitentiary institution and by the latter's speeches and interventions on the issue of prevention and combating violent radicalization and jihadist proselytism.

Chapter 11 (Mohamed Fadil and Solange Lefebvre) is based on interviews with young extremists in Morocco and Quebec. It sheds light on their trajectories and presents the ideological sources, the ambivalence between Quietist and violent Salafism, the concrete media experience by young extremists and the several other determining factors. The first section presents the context and methodology of the project, as well as

some general results. The remaining part exposes one of the key findings of the research, namely the fact that violent extremism is fueled by frameworks which have characteristics connecting them to conspiracy theories.

Viviana Premazzi in Chapter 12 argues that the media plays a fundamental role in creating exclusion and inclusion, good and bad, "terrorists" or "heroes" and can help to overcome the "clash of civilizations" macro-frame showing the complexity of Islam and the complex and multi-faced approach and ways to believe, live and practice Islam of the second generations in Europe. This topic is discussed using data from desk research, media analysis, interviews, focus groups (carried out between 2015 and 2018) and participant observation of experiences and practices developed by second-generation Muslims in Europe, with a particular focus on Italy.

Başak Gemici concludes this book (Chapter 13) examining the most recent emergency rule period in Turkey (2016–2018) from ordinary people's perspectives, which is a crucial yet often sidelined area in analyzing state-security problems. Based on grounded analysis of interview data, it contends that obsession with state-security measures and militarizing public policing under emergency rule produces and deepens ethnic and gendered community insecurities. It concludes by discussing how employing an intersectional human-security approach to emergency rule and studying narratives of everyday vulnerabilities of ordinary people reveal the micro-implications of contemporary securitization processes.

Stefano Bonino
Roberta Ricucci

Contents

1 **Managing the Muslim Diaspora: Comparing Practices and Policies in Several European Cities** 1
Roberta Ricucci

2 **Accepting Muslims But Fearing Islam? Views Toward Islam and Muslims in 16 Western Countries** 21
Besheer Mohamed, Kelsey Starr, and Ariana Salazar

3 **Political Islam: Violent and Non-violent Approaches** 39
Stefano Bonino

4 **Jihadist Terrorism in the United States** 59
Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes

5 **Jihadist Terrorism in Europe** 91
Francesco Marone

6 **Examining the Relationship Between Alienation and Radicalization into Violent Extremism** 115
Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Kerry O'Brien, Peter Lentini, and Greg Barton

7 **The Role of the Dialogical Model of Conflict Resolution in the Prevention of Violent Radicalization** 139
Roger Campdepadrós-Cullell and Lena De Botton

8 Understanding the Interplay of Counter-Extremism Trends and Muslim Communities in Europe 163
Richard McNeil-Willson

9 Intersecting Globalization, Islamophobia, Radicalization, and Securitization 197
Tahir Abbas

10 Muslims in European Prisons: Religious Needs, Management of Diversity, and Policies for Preventing Radicalization in Italian Penitentiaries 217
Mohammed Khalid Rhazzali

11 The Role of Mass Media and Social Media in Islamist Violent Extremism 239
Mohamed Fadil and Solange Lefebvre

12 Heroes or Terrorists? Muslim Second Generations in Western Media 263
Viviana Premazzi

13 Human Security Approach to Emergency Rule in Turkey 281
Başak Gemici

Conclusion 303

CHAPTER 1

Managing the Muslim Diaspora: Comparing Practices and Policies in Several European Cities

Roberta Ricucci

Contrary to the expectations of many observers of modernity, we are not witnessing today an escape from the religious sphere but a different way of belonging to it and expressing it (Brechon 2009; Smith et al. 2011). Faith is more and more a private fact accompanied by a reduction of participation in religious life and observance of the religious rules in the various life areas (from sexuality to morality, from economy to legal issues). This aspect, along with the difficulty of religious institutions in reading and interpreting the needs of orientation and their answers to advanced modernity, makes Berger's "solitary believer" (1992) topical today, reinforcing what Davie identified as "believing without belonging" (1994, 2015). To these two dynamics (persistence of religion in people's lives and the growth of the individualism of faith) can be added, particularly for those who have a migratory background, that of migration

R. Ricucci (✉)
Department of Culture, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
e-mail: roberta.ricucci@unito.it

S. Bonino and R. Ricucci (eds.), *Islam and Security in the West*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67925-5_1

and the coping with stereotypes and discriminatory processes due to their identities of migrants. All this seems more peculiar for Muslims (specifically for those who have a Muslim background, i.e. second and third generations) whether or not they are still foreigners or already citizens of an immigration country and indeed European citizens.

Young people of foreign origin are a significant group and a relevant topic in the European scenario. Hardened over time, sometimes difficult to trace because the origin of the migratory pathways of the parents left no trace either in a double citizenship or in peculiar and visible somatic and/or phenotypic traits (skin colour), the children of immigration are a heterogeneous universe and difficult to define. This group includes both the second generation, now adult, represented by the children of immigrant workers before the entry block of 1973, and children, adolescents and young people approaching adulthood, representatives of the constituent second generations in the old countries of emigration of the Mediterranean. Italy and Spain are part of the latter group; the Netherlands and Germany are part of the former one (Penninx et al. 2006).

In Europe, the issue of the second generation has gained attention and space in the agendas of governments, as well as in the research programmes of scholars from various countries, albeit with different perspectives. In particular, the need to deepen the knowledge of this reality has been strengthened, first after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) and, more recently, those in Paris, Copenhagen (2015), Brussels and Nice (2016), but also after the urban uprisings, from those in the suburbs of some French cities to those in England (2011). All these episodes have strongly focused attention on the results of the integration processes, as well as on the relations among different cultural instances, making dangerous spectres of intolerance and discrimination re-emerge against those who come from Muslim countries (Cesari and McLoughlin 2005; Crul 2016). Therefore, in a climate of suspicion, the children of immigration, sometimes European citizens, have come under observation again, revealing that the granting of citizenship is not enough to avoid processes of differentiation and discrimination related to cultural origin. On the contrary, these conflicts, which have exploded in the urban peripheries, are commented on as a further indicator of the need for urgent reflection on the effectiveness of integration policies and on the destinies of the second generations

(Emerson 2009; Triandafyllidou 2016). Destinations that—in some countries, such as France (Roy 2008), and for some groups, especially Muslims and Sikhs (Simon 2008; Peschke 2009)—are still marked by heavy conditions of marginality and precariousness, witnesses of how in the stories of migration the passage from one generation to another does not always mean upward social mobility. Among all the various issues conditioning the integration paths, the religious identity, and what some authors call the religious symbols emerge onto the scene.

This chapter intends to demonstrate such approaches and answer the following questions: Are interreligious policies and inter-culture regarded by local authorities as an instrument to combat social exclusion and foster Muslims' social inclusion? If so, in which way? The chapter is structured as follows: the following sections provide an overview of the definitions of inter-culture underlying both the policies and the scientific debates, in order to show how these definitions take into account the issue of interreligious perspective and religious pluralism. These initiatives have also inspired most of the existing scientific research. Hence, as far as the scientific debate is concerned, the chapter will outline the trickiest issues conditioning the development of policies in the field. In the fifth section, a typology of the possible different policy approaches to interreligious policies adopted specifically to integrate Muslims will be presented. Therefore, based on the findings of the various studies (Garcés-Mascarenas and Penninx 2016; Kraal and Vertovec 2017; Hoekstra and Dahlvik 2018) carried out between 2015 and 2019, the contribution will discuss to what extent towns and cities can contribute to their social inclusion policies in order to avoid the risk of marginalisation of the Muslim population.[1] The conclusion summarises the main results of this study and highlights its potentialities and limits. Indeed, this chapter will be dedicated to the

[1] During these years I carried out several field visits in the four cities, conducting 50 semi-structured in-depth, face-to-face interviews. Among the key informants were policy-makers, associations' representatives, youth leaders, religious leaders, cultural mediators working in specific urban projects and scholars. In writing this chapter, I benefit from findings of CLIP (Cities for Local Integration Policies) project, in which I carried out the study on Turin. In parts, I followed and updated reflections published in Ricucci (2011, 2013), Caponio et al. (2016), and Ricucci and Mezzetti (2019). In parts of the chapter, I draw on Roberta Ricucci, *Religious education in the Facebook era in the Moroccan diaspora: Muslims on line, young people off line*, paper presented at the ECER Conference, Budapest 2015.

analysis of policies and discourses developed at local level on Muslim and Islamic requests for recognition and integration in a wider perspective.

Any discussion and/or request of recognition dealing with Islam inevitably fits in the broader framework of migration/integration/inclusion debate. Even in the case of towns and cities with a long tradition as host cities: notwithstanding the flux of refugees and asylum seekers associated with what has been usually termed as the "Mediterranean Crisis" has prompted a profound social and political crisis across different European countries, contributing to anti-immigrant feelings (Castles and Miller 1973). Although migrations have experienced substantial changes in their extent and kind over time, one fact remains constant: they are inextricably entangled with religion. Moreover, when it comes to religious affiliations, identities and practices, the integration issue becomes more complicated. In this regard, religious and cultural identities represent a relevant part of the current discourses on diversities within the European context, both at international and national levels (Modood et al. 2006).

Inter-Culturalism as a Tool for Social Inclusion

The issue of social inclusion has become relevant in the management of religious issues, as pointed out by the official documents of the Council of Europe (CoE) and European Union (EU) that in the last two decades have been particularly active in promoting religious pluralism as well as cultural pluralism and inter-culturalism. Towns and cities, on their part, are likely to adopt different approaches on religious pluralism, more or less prone to pursue goals of conflict mediation and social inclusion of immigrants. Furthermore, when integration is explicitly pursued, this can regard either immigrant groups or individuals, depending on the relevance assumed by the dimension of cultural recognition in the town or city's intercultural policies. Various projects aimed at promoting an intercultural approach throughout the learning process and at promoting intercultural dialogue have been launched. A first wave of intercultural policies (dated back in the 1980s) regarded mainly the educational environment: reviewing teaching methods, re-thinking curricula, supporting language learning and the educational success of the minorities, considering diversities including the religious one. In order to achieve these aims, the EU and the CoE have developed a substantial body of programmes.

In the 1990s, the focus on intercultural aspects started to move beyond the sphere of education. Both in official statements and academic debate, intercultural policies began to be regarded as instruments to counter negative attitudes towards the settlement of immigrants and the adverse impact on their living conditions, including access to the labour market and social inclusion more generally (Wilk-Wos 2010).

The idea of intercultural dialogue emerged in this broader sense both in CoE documents and in the recommendations of international organisations (e.g. UNESCO). Also the EU started to reflect on the possible positive effects of intercultural dialogue in preventing conflicts dealing with diversity, especially religious diversity.

Two documents can be considered as particularly relevant in the agenda on intercultural dialogue at local level, both promoted by the CoE. The first was the "Faro Declaration on the CoE's Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue" (2005), in which intercultural discourse was identified as a tool that could be used to forestall conflict. The second was the "White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue" (2008). In this document, the CoE gave a definition of intercultural dialogue as "an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage based on mutual understanding and respect" (CoE 2008, p. 17).

At local level, it was deemed strategic for developing intercultural policies: from school to active citizenship, from cultural activities to positive networking between institutions and civil society organisations (Wood and Landry 2008). The importance of this level was stressed by the attention given to it by the EU's policies in managing urban diversity. From residential neighbourhoods to education systems, from attention to equality and diversity in local authority employment and service provision, the EU increased its focus on diversity and its management at local level, encouraging towns and cities in promoting inter-culturalism at every stage of societal life. The Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World (2007) defined intercultural dialogue as a tool contributing to the governance of cultural diversity within European societies. This agenda confirmed the importance of the issue at EU level reaffirming principles already stated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2002), the Racial Equality Directive (2000) and the Employment Equality Directive (2000). Indeed, especially from 2000 up to now, numerous documents (Recommendations, Declarations and Reports) have contributed to enriching the attention paid to inter-culture within the EU framework.

These efforts have been supplemented with other two initiatives. On the one hand, the launch of the European Year for Intercultural Dialogue aimed at developing and spreading awareness of the importance of intercultural dialogue at both national and local levels, as already acknowledged in the "Common Basic Principles for Integration" (CBP). According to CBP No. 7, "frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens". Within this year, the "Intercultural Cities" project has been launched, promoting the so-called intercultural integration model based on the following principles: emphasising shared values and a plural identity; adapting governance, institutions and services to a diverse population; de-segregation/cultural mixing in institutions and public spaces to build bridges and trust between ethnic communities; dealing with ethnic conflict through mediation and open public debate (CoE 2008). This approach stresses the role of culture and the positive effects of diversity in the development of towns and cities. According to the CoE's perspective,

> rather than ignoring diversity (as with guest-worker approaches), denying diversity (as with assimilationist approaches), or overemphasising diversity and thereby reinforcing walls among culturally distinct groups (as with multiculturalism), inter-culturalism is about explicitly recognising the value of diversity while doing everything possible to increase interaction, mixing and hybridisation among cultural communities. (CoE 2008, p. 27)

Despite the emphasis placed on these perspectives and recommendations, as research in the field highlights,

> the concept of intercultural policies is rather fuzzy and vague, without a broadly accepted definition and without concrete recommendations, and given that policymakers face serious challenges in coping with societal diversity, this deficiency is a serious challenge that should be tackled. (Lücken-Klaßen and Heckmann 2010, p. 7)

Hence, the relations between religious recognition and an intercultural approach are far from straightforward. At local level, different policy

approaches can be highlighted, depending on how inter-culture and religious pluralism are defined by local policymakers. However, it can take different forms that need to be expressed clearly and investigated.

Setting the Framework

Some research (Zincone et al. 2011) discredited the idea of the effectiveness of national models of integration and their changeableness at local level, so that attention shifted towards territorial scenarios where scholars were attempting to understand in depth the dynamics which sprang up among natives, migrants and second generations. Literature on the great models into which various ways of incorporating immigrants were subdivided (from assimilationism to multiculturalism, from *Gastarbeiter-Guest-Workers* to differentialism) put us on our guard, however, against the illusion that national policies no longer played an important role in intervening on the insertion paths of non-autochthonous citizens (Baubök 2012). At the same time, it warned us not to ignore (as sometimes happened in the past) the influence of the local context and everyday dynamics "triggered by diversity in the management of daily life".[2] The game of inclusion and social cohesion (of which religion was an important theme) was really played out in the field of integration policies at local level, including relations with Muslims, both old and young, and first and second generations.

Obviously, towns, cities and neighbourhoods differed as to the composition of the immigrant population, its socio-demographic characteristics, initiatives and opportunities available to them, and as to modalities of relations with the general citizenry and consequent social-cohesion processes. In other words, they differed regarding the so-called local integration policies (Campomori 2008). Among these strategies, there were those pertaining to the management of religious difference, which—albeit in a multi-religious environment[3]—ended as relations among towns and

[2] In this context, management of immigration in Italy offers various examples of how national norms become declined differently at local level (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Caponio 2006).

[3] In Italy, Christians constitute 56% of immigrants, Muslims 32% and oriental religions 7%. In order to define how many Muslims (and also Orthodox, Hindus, Buddhists, etc.) there are among immigrants, the method used consists of projecting the religious beliefs of their countries of origin onto those immigrants. We do not take into consideration how

cities and the Muslim presence. Among immigrant and Muslims as a whole, religiosity was alive, as evidenced by the existence of mosques and musallas, the increasing requests for legal recognition, insertion in school programmes, time-off for religious holidays, possibility to build mosques, availability of sharia compliant products. Research and studies focused on the growing presence of Muslims (Cesari and Pacini 2005; Bracke and Fadil 2008; Moghissi and Gorashi 2010; Open Society Institute 2011), through observations and insights carried out from different perspectives: religious beliefs and practices, hope for a certain type of society (secular versus Islamic), definition of identity (religious, national, cosmopolitan), orientation regarding the education of children and intermarriage and requests made to educational institutions (recognition of holidays, religious teaching in school). In addition, attention to the religious variable was correlated with that dedicated to labour issues (Are Muslims discriminated against in the labour market, compared to other religious affiliations?), schools (Does the increasing number of Muslim students give rise to claims against secularisation and changes in education?), urban schedules and spaces, with specific requests regarding nutrition, places of worship and areas for the burial of the dead.

To some extent the local dimension was overlooked in that it means, on the one hand, that local policies intervened in managing the daily lives of Muslim communities and, on the other, that it was the arrival on the scene of the second generation that modified (strengthening or weakening, modifying or erasing) their fathers' and mothers' recognition demands, which had sometimes provoked a public reaction on the part of the citizenry. Across Europe there are several experiences of how at the local level, cities are trying to counteract the risk of radicalisation and insecurity coming from religious fundamentalism (mainly Islamic fundamentalism). Focusing on the experience of four European cities which—in virtue of their history of immigration, volume of the Muslim presence and policies for managing immigration—qualify as privileged observatories for seeing how the management of Islam takes place at local level, we can discuss the topic. Although with different immigration, the four cities (two of ancient immigration, Berlin and Amsterdam, and two of more recent immigration, Turin and Barcelona) share some traits that

religious behaviour might change over the course of time or how religiousness during migration can change, growing weaker or stronger (Centro Studi e Ricerche Idos 2013, p. 207).

make them comparable: a distribution of Muslim residents concentrated in some neighbourhoods, the persistence of exclusion and discrimination dynamics, access to housing in the private market, in neighbourhood negative relations towards those considered Muslim, the persistence of linguistic difficulties among the first and subsequent generations, and especially among women. Alongside these traits, all the involved key informants shared the comments on a sense of belonging of Muslims to the local reality of residence (datum which has been already confirmed by local and international surveys) and the progressive insertion in the middle class of an increasing number of Muslim families. As intercultural association representatives commented in Barcelona and Turin, the upward mobility of Muslim families represents a success of cities' inclusion policies.

However, it is crucial to continue to look after to those who are in the most vulnerable situations and at risk of being fascinated by fundamentalist arguments and leaders, as cultural mediators, parents and stakeholders firmly stressed in all the four contexts. To this extent developing observatories, research, and also cooperation between institutions and civil society organisations, and the Islamic one, is crucial: combating radicalisation phenomena and risks of dangerous marginalisation processes requires a constant monitoring activity adopting a 360-degree approach which also includes institutions, schools, religious and cultural associations and other organisations working with both adult and young people, Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.

Scrutinising the four cities there are elements of convergence: the creation of forums in order to meet the representatives of Muslim associationism, promotion of programmes aimed at stressing the development of a common shared identity at local level (e.g. the initiative "Wij Amsterdammers"—We the Citizens of Amsterdam), organisation of events to present Islam to the wider range of citizens and to combat prejudices and stereotypes (e.g. Iftar Street in Turin). Finally, in all the contexts, active protagonists are seen in both the younger people and the women so as to contrast paths of marginality that can lead to radicalisation: in Amsterdam, there is the Vlam Flame, a women's group that helps women pursue jobs or education by offering information, empowerment courses and individual career counselling; in Berlin, Mothers without Borders (Mutter ohne Grenzen), an initiative focused on confronting local crime and drugs through activities such as night-time neighbourhood patrols by different groups of women.

Elements of the Debate

Local level is thus the privileged observatory from which to view how governing Islam works and whether or how it is modified in the passage from the first generation of immigrants to the second. It is at local level that one can analyse the specific recognition requests that Muslims address to public institutions in order to safeguard the culture they belong to and their life-practices. Moreover, it is at local level that young people start to become leaders of the life of mosques, make suggestions and measure themselves against the adults of their communities with regard to the management of Islam in a setting where they are a minority religion.

There are two knotty problems in the debate:

1. *Representation*. As Ronchi reminds us, "The State and public authorities should be able to 'relate to' one or more interlocutors who represent and reveal needs – primarily cultural – of their members" (Ronchi 2011, p. 102). In other words, it is essential to understand "who represents whom". Grasping the real significance of religion-inspired associations, and their bond with the whole community of the faithful, is no trivial matter—especially locally, where negotiations take place in a climate of increasing competition among civil society organisations for ever-diminishing public resources. Numerousness, historical presence, diffusion throughout the socio-economic fabric of various contexts, active participation in cultural and charitable initiatives promoted by institutions and associations, all contribute to giving a hearing to Muslim demands. This, however, is only one side of the coin. The other concerns informal means of representation, translated into encouraging organisational systems, which are closer to the public: from neighbourhood round-table debates to gathering in the communities' meeting places, from bringing together natives and immigrants to relations with "stakeholders" (Saint-Blancat 1999). It is not easy to identify the last. Are they to be found in places of worship? What kind of relations do they develop with ethnic-national associationism? In addition, what is the role of other meeting places, important for first generations, such as butchers' shops, other shops and ethnic premises? In this scenario, do cultural mediators play a privileged part because of their special position, often within institutions, relating to Italian operators and citizens while, at the same time, being capable of noticing the facets and cultural-identity implications of requests forwarded by Islamic communities?

2. *"Immigrant" places of worship*. It is proving hard to lose the label. The connection is clear for first generations who bear it in mind while it influenced their recognition requests. For the second generations born and living in Europe, the matter becomes a paradox: although they are not migrants themselves, they are considered (and sometimes treated) as such. The Muslim-foreigner binomial leads public debate to specific topics (e.g. concession of cemetery spaces) of the wider immigration discussion: employment competition, welfare forecasts and socio-assistential guarantees. These aspects, which concerned only certain neighbourhoods in the four cities scrutinised (e.g. Kreutzberg in Berlin or Porta Palazzo in Turin), have other places become important to the political programmes of mayors and parties active at local level, uniting with the aforementioned themes of reciprocity and safety (Saint-Blancat and Schmid di Friedberg 2005). Mazzola states that "the mayor and city council could be negatively influenced by those who, on the ground, are not favourably disposed towards public manifestations of a religious nature, particularly those held by certain religious minorities" (Mazzola 2009, p. 413). This discourse recalls towns and cities where Islamophobic entrepreneurship-politics gave rise to legal activities in the Muslim population (e.g. lack of recognition of religious holidays, inserting legal obstacles for building mosques). But, compared with the 2011 debate and subsequent polemics, the clash in the first months of 2014 saw a passion on the part of the young generations—girls in particular—which has never been experienced before.

Are we witnessing a generational shift? A changing of the guard in the Islamic community, at least at local level? Even if it is too early to detect signs of what would be a Copernican revolution, there is no doubt that young children of immigration bound to Islam are moving centre stage (Frisina 2010). It is one possible result in the context of processes triggered when the children of immigration grow up: from this point of view, too, Italy is following a path already familiar to other European countries with a less recent immigration history (Cesari 2010). Even if Frisina, in 2008, revealed a cautious, softly-softly attitude, behind the lines, on the part of young Muslims towards putting forward their point of view, things no longer seem to be like this: second generations' visibility and self-promotion have grown. This evolution makes us aware of organisational skills and a widespread territorial presence, but above all, it demonstrates the need of the children of immigration—religious event—for expression and identification (Jonker and Amiraux 2006).

Cities in the Mirror

There is a kind of step-by-step path that leads Muslims in Europe from being silent workers to becoming activists in demanding full respect for the freedom of religion inscribed in the constitutions of democratic countries. In the context of the various European cities investigated, it is possible to retrace these stages, which are summarised in Table 1.1.

The change of register is significant: as Scholten (2011) and Caponio and Borkert (2010) argued, we go from being the recipients of interventions to becoming co-protagonists in policymaking. In this sense, the intercultural declination, in the meaning of an "inclusive intercultural policy", pushes relations between Islamic associationism and local institutions to get out of the (explosive and reductive) dichotomy of immigrants vs. citizens. It is no longer a question of presenting demands that "confine" Islam to a question that is specific to immigrants, whose gaze is nostalgically turned to the past, but of inserting the discourse in the most coveted debate on religious pluralism, freeing it from the link with immigration. Energy is invested to build partnership relations, to conquer areas of credibility and recognition: that is to say, to become reliable interlocutors of institutions, schools. In fact, the new actors often have no experience of migration, sometimes they are Italian citizens: that is, young people from another religion who seek space and express the will

Table 1.1 Requests from Muslim associations at local and national level

Period	*Actors involved*	*Requests to the town/city*	*Requests to the state*
1980s	Converted Europeans and first generations emerge	Ritual slaughter of animals, differentiated diet, prayer rooms	Recognition
1990s	Mainly first generations, representatives of associationism and the imams	Better prayer rooms, teaching of Islam at school, cemeteries	Understanding and agreement
2000s	1.5 and 2 generations, women, Muslim associationism	Mosques and requests for involvement in intercultural activities	Understanding and agreement
Since 2010	Second and subsequent generations	Requests for participation and involvement	Respect of the constitutional right to religious freedom

Source Author's creation

to participate in the intercultural and interreligious policies of their town or city.

The terrain of "symbolic religiosity" (Gans 2009), in which second- and third-generation religious identities are only vaguely linked to beliefs and rites, but rather held together and strengthened by the common belonging to an association. Through symbolic religiosity, belonging to Islam can be translated into recognition of a common Muslim identity, shared and practiced within the associative activities, but not necessarily linked to the observance of practices. Therefore, there is dissociation between the practicing Muslim and the one who recognises in Islam a cultural and identity reference. As regards this distinction, new demands and relations take shape (more on the side of collaboration and sharing than on the side of rupture and opposition) with the local reality. The aim is not so much the recognition *tout court* of one's own specificities, as much as the right to diversity and the promotion of intercultural policies, in which religious difference is one of the elements of the town's/city's social fabric and not a factor of conflict.

The protagonists of this season are above all the second generations, on which many administrations have decided to aim, as key figures to promote paths of social cohesion. In fact, rationally thinking on the paths of integration of young Muslims means to deepen the reflection on the ability of all the actors on stage of the relations between the natives and the migrants and their children (from teachers to operators of associationism). Finally, they represent an important test for intergenerational dynamics, within both the different ethnic communities and the entire citizenship, where perceptions of adults and already elderly people are challenged by the different paths of integration of the children of immigration.

What attitude do local institutions take on? Relations between immigrated associationism and the town or city can be framed according to prevailing positions.

The four modalities described in Table 1.2 may represent subsequent phases in the experiences of the towns and cities: in all the contexts examined, paths of knowledge and collaboration in the area of intercultural activities and those of a consultative nature seem to prevail, as recently underlined by the promotion of roundtables dedicated to interreligious dialogue (Caponio and Ricucci 2015).

In these dynamics, the arrival of second generations on the public scene introduces a new element in the debate. The recognition of the children

Table 1.2 Type of relations between associations and local institutions

		Level of involvement of immigrant associationism in city life	
		−	+
City attitude/ Type activities promoted	Reactive Interactive	Informative Collaborative	Consultative Decision-making

Source Re-adaption from Saksela-Begholm (2009)

of immigration as key actors in building social cohesion and dialogue between natives and immigrants has been part of the policies in different towns and cities for some years. In this direction, young foreigners and young people of foreign origin have been supported in their activities of active citizenship, in the organisation and promotion of autonomous associative activities. Even in the religious field.

The cities of Barcelona, Amsterdam, Turin and Berlin, albeit with different time frames, and in the face of heterogeneous Muslim communities, have developed in their policies of inclusion and management of religious pluralism, with great attention to inter-dialogue relations and to the young children of immigration. Young people have become important subjects in building or strengthening social cohesion processes, above all in the districts where relations between natives and foreigners may be more difficult and where controversies and disputes on cultural and religious diversity are rekindled, incited by international events. This choice is not only translated into opportunities of intervention, but also in the support of associative protagonists, in a perspective of promotion and growth in the area of an idea of "active citizenship", and in complete contrast with the radicalisation processes in which also the dimensions of faith are to be found.

A reading of the phenomenon over time allows us to resume, in detail, the points of strength and weakness in relations with the towns and cities of the first- and second-generation associationism. Initially, relations were above all "by request". The associations, weak from an organisational point of view and little prepared to interact with administrations, were placed on a dimension for the most part "by request": be it spaces or funds for small initiatives. With the youngest people, relations moved towards the collaboration front: mainly prepared both linguistically and on the merits of the functioning of the bureaucratic machine,

the new generations aim at being recognised as partners. They want to be present and active in the cultural manifestations of the towns and cities, to intervene, where possible, in the decision-making processes to reinforce the theme that Islam is compatible with citizen protagonists. Aspirations collide—also on those territories where the integration policies at local level are more advanced (Ponzo and Ricucci 2011; Caponio et al. 2016)—with reality, which sees the associations of the second generations, although appreciated by a large part of local political alignments, not yet able to replace the associationism of their fathers as reference points for the institutions. We must pay attention however not to confuse the absence in the political and decisional process with the absence in the debate regarding questions of interest: the voice on how the children of immigration intend to decline Muslim belonging is diffused through the participation in congresses, the organisation of public events and, above all, the Internet. Websites and the community become the stage on which to express their own points of view, as well as the place where to interact with other young people, in other countries.

Conclusions

The growth of a Muslim population who becomes German, Spanish, Dutch or Italian marks a symbolic change and concrete effects within the European scene. A transformation that concerns the direct protagonists (mainly the young) and reverberates in their relationship with society translates into the relationship with religious identity and the wider debate, which strongly links Islam with terrorism and security affairs. The entry into adult life and into the community of European citizens of the children of Muslim immigration invites scholars and professionals, service providers, teachers and residents to become aware of the fluidity and the many possible variations in terms of religious identities and to cope with the risks of stigmatisation and marginalisation of the youngest generations. In this sense—and also on the side of faith—the interviewees give voice to a reality that no longer wants to be in the spotlight because it is foreign or traceable to practices and rituals of other geographical contexts, but to be considered real to the generation of young people who now study at university, seek work, try to become adults and build an autonomy of living and income.

Despite the fact that across the European cities the religious panorama is increasingly plural, the focus is always on Islam. A polycentric universe,

even if stereotypes and simplifications continue to represent it as univocal and devoid of facets. Alternatively, even fractures. Yet they are there, and many of them. Moreover, in this case, it is a question of recording an increase in the so-called *Islamic archipelago*, in the number of prayer centres, cultural associations, and mosques in small and large centres. There has also been an increase in the number of reference figures and their degree of interaction with local, national and even European realities; there is concern about those who have a Muslim background and the perception that European society has of them, of how to guarantee religious socialisation in a context where being a minority confession often means not having adequate space, and still facing closures as happened at the beginning of immigration. The side effect of this situation could be a negative impact on social inclusion: lack of recognition, continuous experiences of discrimination and identity mis-perception could reinforce feelings of being marginalised, opening the doors to negative attitudes towards the city/country of residence till becoming radicalised. There are possibilities to change this narrative.

Indeed, developments in all the cities illustrate how it is possible to establish "large scale" intervention strategies, acting on different fronts to work towards a single aim: in other words, as well as supporting young people of Muslim origin to enter the various societal domains, there must be measures in place in the areas where these young people reside (e.g. social promotion, urban requalification projects). The factors that account for the success of these initiatives include a careful analysis of the characteristics of the areas where the projects are deployed, and the implementation of structural initiatives, not just focused on micro-random funded projects. For example, support aimed at helping young people make choices in education must necessarily go hand in hand with support for educational attainment and/or the involvement of families. These projects are complex ones which involve various subjects and often bring together different working approaches: the challenge of working both with the beneficiaries (the young people) and their context (from families to their ethnic religious associations to the local area in which they live). The efficacy of these projects is at times conditioned by the availability of resources (human and financial, firstly; but also, political and cultural), and the fact that the idea of "doing something" can take precedence over specific know-how—that is to say, there is a tendency to increase the number of activities, without always ensuring that the correct professional know-how is deployed.

All the cities demonstrate that it is a mistake to view the current Muslim generation from the same perspective used to conceive and design initiatives for those who joined Europe in the 50s and 60s. The situation calls for a paradigm shift that takes account of the specific characteristics of the European citizens who belong to Islam. In the policy-leaning and policy transferability perspectives, it is clear that the challenge of reducing the risks of radicalisation and insecurity should be taken into account the following lesson learnt: (a) any policy should be anchored to an ongoing and updated observation of the characteristics of Muslim population: research programmes and policy-oriented analyses can give local administrations useful pointers when it comes to policymaking; (b) involve NGOs and grass-rooted associations in both planning and implementing policies addressing Muslims; (c) promote the participation of Muslim stakeholders in the decision-making processes devoted to discuss integration/social inclusion initiatives; (d) provide intercultural initiatives rather than only Muslim-focused projects: Muslims are residents and projects towards them should be inserted in a broader scenario considering feelings (and reactions) of the whole local population.

The final consideration deals with the need of promoting policies that are effective but also integrated in the various societal fields, guaranteeing continuity over time. Interesting but "isolated" experimental initiatives tacking the risk of marginalisation which could become pathways to radicalisation cannot be the norm for local institutional policies in order to gain valuable and durable effects in the field of inclusion. Indeed, all the explored cities show to what extent all programmes focusing on social inclusion through an intercultural approach should be not a one-time project but a continuous, dynamic process open to consider other issues as they become important. In this way, projects aimed to promote civic education, participation and solidarity among Muslim and non-Muslim residents represent a willingness to think beyond each and aim towards the future.

References

Baubök, R. (2012). Migration and Citizenship: Normative Debates. In D. Tichenor & M. Rosenblum (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration* (pp. 594–613). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berger, P. (1992). *Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity*. New York: Free Press.

Bracke, S., & Fadil, N. (2008). *Islam and Secular Modernity Under Western Eyes: A Genealogy of a Constitutive Relationship*. San Domenico di Fiesole: RSCAS EUI Working Papers, 2008/05.

Brechon, P. (2009). La mesure de l'appartenance et de la non-appartenance confessionnelle dans les grandes enquêtes européennes. *Social Compass, 56,* 163–178.

Campomori, F. (2008). *Immigrazione e cittadinanza locale. La governance dell'integrazione in Italia*. Roma: Carocci.

Caponio, T. (2006). *Città Italiane e immigrazione*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Caponio, T., & Borkert, M. (Eds.). (2010). *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Caponio, T., Ponzo, I., & Ricucci, R. (2016). Changement de politique publique ou modification de style de politique publique? In M. Sacco, C. Torrekens, & I. Adam (Eds.), *Circulation des idées et des modéles: les transformations de l'action publique en question. Le cas des politiques d'intégration* (pp. 123–137). Louvain-La-Neuve: Academia-L'Harmattan.

Caponio, T., & Ricucci, R. (2015). Interculturalism: A Policy Instrument Supporting Social Inclusion? In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities, Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 20–34). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (1973). *The Age of Migration*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Centro Studi e Ricerche Idos (Eds.). (2013). *Rapporto UNAR Immigrazione Dossier Statistico 2013* (p. 207). Roma: Unar-Idos.

Cesari, J. (2010). Identità religiose e gioventù musulmana in Europa. *Mondi Migranti, 2,* 151–169.

Cesari, J., & McLoughlin, S. (2005). *European Muslims and the Secular State*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Cesari, J., & Pacini, A. (2005). *Giovani musulmani in Europa*. Torino: Edizioni Fondazione Agnelli.

Crul, M. (2016). Super-Diversity vs. Assimilation: How Complex Diversity in Majority–Minority Cities Challenges the Assumptions of Assimilation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *42*(1), 54–68.

Davie, G. (1994). *Religion in Britain Since 1945*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davie, G. (2015). *Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Emerson, M. (Ed.). (2009). *Ethno-religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe's Muslim Communities*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).

Council of Europe. (2008). *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. Living Together as Equals in Dignity*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Frisina, A. (2008). *Giovani Musulmani d'Italia*. Roma: Carocci.

Frisina, A. (2010). Autorappresentazioni pubbliche di giovani musulmane. La ricerca di legittimità di una nuova generazione di italiane. *Mondi Migranti, 2,* 131–150.

Gans, H. J. (2009). First Generation Decline: Downward Mobility Among Refugees and Immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32*(9), 1658–1670.

Garcés-Mascarenas, B., & Penninx, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe*. Cham: Springer.

Guolo, R. (2003). *Xenofobi e xenofili: gli italiani e l'islam*. Bari-Roma: Laterza.

Guolo, R. (2005). Il campo religioso musulmano in Italia. *Rassegna Italiana Di Sociologia, 4,* 631.

Hoekstra, M. S., & Dahlvik, J. (2018). Neighbourhood Participation in Super-Diverse Contexts: Comparing Amsterdam and Vienna. *Urban Research & Practice, 11*(4), 441–459.

Jonker, G., & Amiraux, V. (Eds.). (2006). *Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Kraal, K., & Vertovec, S. (2017). *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Lüken-Klaßen, D., & Heckmann, F. (2010). *Intercultural Policies in European Cities*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Mazzola, R. (2009). Libertà di culto e "sicurezza urbana" nella "Direttiva del Ministro dell'Interno per le manifestazioni nei centri urbani e nelle aree sensibili". *Quaderni Di Diritto E Politica Ecclesiastica, 2,* 403–414.

Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (2006). *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*. London: Routledge.

Moghissi, H., & Gorashi, H. (2010). *Muslim Diaspora in the West*. London: Ashgate.

Open Society Institute. (2011). *Muslims in Europe*. New York, London, and Budapest: Open Society Institute.

Penninx, R., Rath, J. C., & Rindoks, A. N. (2006). *Gaining from Migration. What Works in Networks? Examining Economically Related Benefits Accrued from Greater Economic Linkages, Migration Processes, and Diasporas*. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, IMISCOE.

Peschke, D. (2009). *The Role of Religion for the Integration of Migrants and Institutional Responses in Europe: Some Reflections*. Geneva: World Council of Churches.

Ponzo. I., & Ricucci, R. (2011). *Second-Generations: A New Actor on the Scene of Intercultural Policies?* Paper delivered at IMISCOE Conference, Warsaw, 9–10 September.

Ricucci, R. (2011). Nuovi italiani in cerca di rappresentanza. *Italianieuropei*, n. 6, 87–92.

Ricucci, R. (2013). Becoming Adults During an Economic Crisis: What Happens to the Second Generations? *Sociology Study, 4*(10), 752–762.

Ricucci, R. (2015). *Cittadini senza cittadinanza*. Torino: SEB27.
Ricucci, R., & Mezzetti, G. (2019). Political Opportunity Structures and the Activism of First- and Second-Generation Muslims in Two Italian Cities. *Religion, State & Society, 47*(4), 405–422.
Ronchi, P. (2011). Problemi pratici della libertà religiosa dei musulmani in Italia, Spagna e Regno Unito. *Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico Del Estado, 27,* 102.
Roy, O. (2008). *La Sainte Ignorance. Le temps de la religion sans culture*. Paris: Seuil.
Saint-Blancat, C. (Ed.). (1999). *L'Islam in Italia: una presenza al plurale*. Roma: Edizioni Lavoro.
Saint-Blancat, C., & Schmid di Friedberg, O. (2005). Why Are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31*(6), 1083–1104.
Scholten, P. (2011). *Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective*. IMISCOE research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Simon, P. (2008). The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France. *French Politics, Culture & Society, 26*(1), 7–31.
Smith, C., Christoffersen, K., Davidson, H., & Snell Herzog, P. (2011). *Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood*. Oxford: University Press.
Triandafyllidou, A. (2016). *The Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies*. London: Routledge.
Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.
Wilk-Wos, Z. (2010). The Role of Intercultural Dialogue in the EU Policy. *Journal of Intercultural Management, 2*(1), 78–88.
Wood, P. K., & Landry, C. (2008). *The Intercultural City: Planning for Diversity Advantage*. London: Earthscan.
Zincone, G., Penninx, R., & Borkert, M. (Eds.). (2011). *Migration Policy-making in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

CHAPTER 12

Heroes or Terrorists? Muslim Second Generations in Western Media

Viviana Premazzi

Media and the "Creation of the Other"

Media are the place where the "creation of the Other" takes place. Various research studies (Maneri 2001; Ter Wal 2001; Alexander 2006; Pogliano 2013) have also highlighted how the foreigners, the migrants, in the narrative of the media, may find themselves used for the construction of "the other" as the common enemy against "our" community. "The Others", the foreigners, in the media have in fact been often subject to a problematic thematization of their presence, with an emphasis on the issues of crime, violence, poverty and terrorism.

This seems particularly true in the Italian case with the increase in immigration and the association of immigration with crime over the past three decades. According to Ernesto Calvanese (2011, p. 12), "not a day goes by when immigration is not talked about by the media, and not a day goes by without hints of danger, of crime, of social alarm, of the annoyance correlated – ineluctably and deterministically – with this topic".

V. Premazzi (✉)
University of Malta and Global Mindset Development, Msida, Malta
e-mail: viviana@gmdmalta.com

S. Bonino and R. Ricucci (eds.), *Islam and Security in the West*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67925-5_12

This helps to self-fuel and reinforce the same stereotypes and prejudices, linking migration with conflict, crime, violence and social problems.

Moreover, as shown by Pogliano and Zanini (2010), foreigners in Italy have been, with rare exceptions, objects of representation that cancels their singularity and their identities in favour of the creation of homogeneous groups, anonymity and stereotypes. Immigrants are represented mainly by their "ethnic-racial" ("Moroccans", "blacks", "Muslims", etc.) or legal (asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, regular and irregular, EU and non-EU) traits and in association with negative and dangerous behaviours.

Other studies (Cohen 1972; Hall et al. 1978) explain this as the creation of a folk devil (public enemy of moral panic) that actually helps a fragmented and multicultural society to rebuild itself behind the ideal idea of "we" against them. The creation of a moral panic means "the activation of emotions and reactions in which an episode or group of people is defined as a threat to the values of a society; the mass media present its nature in a stereotypical way" (Cohen 1972 in Maneri 2001, p. 14).

The media rituals (Cottle 2006) affecting the representations of migrants can range from cases of robberies, murders, terrorism, etc. and they create alarm, related to security of a country or a society, and produce a division between locals (we) and immigrants (they).

But in this chapter, we are going to consider not only the separation and moral division between locals and foreigners but also between first and second generations. Until the creation of the Islamic State in fact what has happened on the Western media has been the idea of the first generation of migrants flatten on the issues of violence and crime and on the frame of the migrant invasion, supported also by the visual representations, while the second generations have been included in the community of "we" because of their assimilation choices and through the radical exclusion of the first (Pogliano and Premazzi 2014).

This kind of news and narratives generally follow a very specific script: adult migrants commit violence against their own close relative (in most of the cases a female young second generation—the daughter, the young wife, the granddaughter). The victim is described as a person who is freeing herself from traditional family norms and is trying to make choices in line with the values of the host society; the perpetrators are described as conservative and representatives of traditional values incompatible with

the society and as people who are willing to defend these values with violence and even murder. This news mostly concern Muslims and are inscribed in a discourse on Islam versus modernity/democracy, fully reported using a culturalist frame in support of the thesis of incompatibility of Muslim culture with the Western one (Morey and Yaqin 2011), and more specifically they have been connected to the debate around the condition of women in "Islamic culture".

In an article written with Pogliano a few years ago (Pogliano and Premazzi 2014), we described this media ritual as a selective ritual: media produce generalizations and create two homogeneous and separate groups, the first and the second generations. The second generations are more similar to and aspire to become like their peers in the host society, values like youth, beauty, fashion and resistance to tradition are highlighted and celebrated in newspapers and magazines' articles, while the first generations are excluded (or better, in the journalistic narrative, they exclude themselves) because they have different values and aspirations than the second generations and the host society. Especially when related to crime news the focus is on clashes between the first and the second generation with the latter wanting to live and dress "in the Western way" and the first generation violently opposing it (Pogliano 2015). The central point of the selective rituals is instead entirely cultural: it is produced by inscribing these events in the macro-frame of the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996).

This narrative focuses on cases of success or "normal" and "peaceful", unproblematic presence, and ends up covering together with the second generations also other two specific categories: successful entrepreneurs and workers described as cases of exemplary honesty and reliability (domestic workers and carers, mainly Filipino women and Sikh Indians working in dairies). They are often described as having one or more of the following characteristics:

- the achievement of socio-economic success, in clear contrast to the stereotype of the migrant as a miserable subject and held in the crime network or creating "ghettos" (the image of Chinatown);
- the docility/reliability with which they carry out useful activities for the target company (the Sikhs who contribute to the production of

a typical Italian product and the domestic workers/caregivers who make up for the weakness of the welfare system), in contrast to the predominant image of the migrant as deviant or criminal or even as a "suspect";
– schooling in the country of arrival and parallel assimilation to the pop culture, as opposed to the stereotype of the migrant as a low-skilled and strongly linked to traditional customs and values (Pogliano and Zanini 2010; Pogliano and Premazzi 2014).

Success, docility and cultural assimilation are the three points around which the media shape that figure that they implicitly call "the integrated immigrant". To these characteristics is added, at the visual level, the smile and the reciprocated gaze that are typical of the visual construction (the portrait form) and which clearly contrast with the much more widespread image of the immigrant: never smiling, often defined visually and verbally as desperate or hidden from view (photographed from behind or from the back, with the face partially covered by the veil or made invisible by the distance or, again, approached to the ground during prayer, the typical moment in which the Muslim faithful are generally frozen in photography).

In this context of representations, the second generations, described as successful young migrants, Western dressed, cheerful and peaceful (intent on smiling at the camera) are the most successful product of this narrative construction of the integrated immigrant.

This leads to the creation of that symbolic boundary that clearly separates "us" and "them" and contributes to highlighting it. While the Sikh Indians in the dairies and the Filipino or Eastern European women in the apartments retrace the imagery of the "good and gentle migrant" who has many assonances with a certain representation of the colonized (Decimo and Demaria 2010), the real element of novelty in journalistic representations of migration is the second generation.

Also, not only the second generations are the object described by the media but in the last decade they have also tried to be the subject being hosted as bloggers or contributors in specific sections of some national

newspapers,[1] or in magazines. But studies have shown that the participation of the second generations in the construction or co-construction of the narratives have been placed entirely within the intercultural frame, assuming most of the times, only and exclusively the role of second-generation migrants.

Till the creation of the Islamic State and the new narratives related to the second generations that spread over Western media since then, the process of generalization and distinction that affected migrants in the media and has been supported by the rituals of the media has shown the symbolic production of a double border. The first border, formed in very recent years, passes primarily through the generational and gender lines, in the sense that it can be crossed almost exclusively by second-generation migrants, mainly by young women. Some specific attributes associated with youth (courage, revolutionary strength) and the female gender (having historically undergone the power and desire for emancipation) seem to play an important role in separation rituals, helping to define the world of the first generation through counter-attributes, the very embodiment of a traditional culture viewed as static and violent (mainly male). Through the production of this border, the other border is strengthened, the one between "us" and "them". Once symbolically included (under certain conditions) the second generations in the "we" community, the violence of the first generation is understood as a direct and obvious expression of the "other" culture which through those violence expresses its refusal to integrate, to accept the values of "our" society.

Muslims, Media and Islamophobia

Among migrants, since 9/11, Muslims and the Muslim identity in the media, has been pictured as The Other, eternal guests and a threat to security (Salih 2004), an ideal homogeneous "they", the Muslims, opposed to "us".

Islamophobia has been defined by Miles and Brown (2003) as hostility specifically directed towards Muslims as such. According to the scholars, we may talk about Islamophobia when some of the following elements are present: Islam is seen as monolithic, static and insensitive to change,

[1] "Gli altri siamo noi" (La Stampa newspaper), "Immigrato a chi? Storie (belle) di un'Italia integrata" (Il sole 24 ore newspaper), "La città nuova" (Il Corriere della Sera newspaper).

separate from and without shared values with other cultures, irrational, sexist, violent, aggressive and supporting terrorism.

In recent years, anti-Muslim feelings have been fuelled above all by the association of Islam with terrorism, especially in the wake of the proclamation of the Islamic State and renewed attacks and violence undertaken "in the name of Islam", re-activating the barely-forgotten Muslim-terrorism and immigrant-terrorism associations started with 9/11 and that has the effect of dehumanizing Muslims (Euro-Barometer 2015; Demos & Pi 2017). Terrorism has reinforced the symbolic idea of Islam as the ultimate otherness, which is to say those who practice a religion and follow values and ways of behaviour perceived as being too far and different from our ways of thinking and acting, and remarkable for their power of penetration. With regard to Islam, however, repeated public representation of the fact that such a cultural and religious structure cannot be assimilated, or is incompatible with democracy, threatens to stress the clash of civilizations element, unleashing a self-fulfilling prophecy (Premazzi and Ricucci 2020). As Philip Seib (in Peta 2018, p. 173) highlights "many journalists shy away from religious topics, and this creates a vacuum of public knowledge that leads to defining a religion of 1.6 million people by the acts of the few who spill blood in a Manchester arena or a Baghdad marketplace. And because there is such limited understanding of Islam in the non-Muslim world, many news consumers are prone to accept the idea that Islam-equals-terrorism".

Indeed, hostility towards immigrants in the recent years overlaps with animosity shown towards Islamic extremism, justified by accusations of disloyalty towards the countries where numerous, variegated Islamic communities reside, constituting an internal enemy threatening to perpetrate violent attacks against their host countries.

On the other side, journalists and academics strive also to frame new figures with whom they can talk, that the society can "integrate" or that are already "integrated" and that can cross that border "we versus they": the "moderate Muslim", the "European Muslim" (Coglievina and Premazzi 2015). But these expressions seem implicitly suggest so that Islam is in its essence not "moderate" (Peta 2018). To these Muslims is generally requested, although they are not reported or highlighted by the mass media, to make public statements of condemnation of terrorism and religious extremism, often used to "reassure" the society in which Muslim migrants live.

Especially during 2014 after the self-proclamation of the Islamic State, some of the Islamic organizations in Italy, principally those which had acquired a role and an importance at national level, clearly stated their non-involvement in fundamentalist and violent interpretations, considering them a deviation from the correct interpretation of Islam. In particular, many reiterated that Islam does not justify violence against believers of other religions and that those who commit acts of extremism, war and oppression are just using religion for political aims and power.[2]

Religious fundamentalism, along with the inaccuracy, misrepresentation and sensationalist approach of the media to the issue, have been also unfortunately exploited by populist tendencies and they have supported forms of anti-Islamic political propaganda, and anti-immigration feeling (Siino and Levantino 2015; Giacalone 2016; Barretta and Milazzo 2017; Peta 2018) that on the other side can lead to discrimination and the development of reactive identities and radicalization.

First and Second Generations Between National and Local Dimension

The media could actually play a fundamental role if they could include among their articles also Muslims' perspective and their contribution to civic life, promoting the idea of active citizenship in a post-secular society, finding a space for the religious dimension, to balance the negative coverage. The second and third generations in particular are extremely active at the local level and are demanding to participate in decision-making process—and not only with regard to young people of Muslim faith—strengthening in this way the idea that Islam is compatible with citizens' activism, pluralism and democracy. As Ricucci (2015, p. 76) highlights: "The purpose has not been so much the recognition *tout court* of their specificities, but their right to diversity and the promotion of intercultural policies where religious difference is one of the elements of the city and not a reason of conflict". Moreover, online, through the social media, they are able to reach Muslims and non-Muslims and promote a different message than the one presented by the traditional media.

[2] Events and declarations can be found in Coglievina and Premazzi (2015).

The association Young Muslims of Italy, with its local groups, is one of the most important examples. In this context, it is interesting to mention on one side the myriad of interreligious activities they have organized since 2001, when the association Young Muslims of Italy (*Giovani Musulmani d'Italia*) was established (Frisina 2007), and, on the other, the cultural and social activities carried out to promote the knowledge of Islam among the non-Muslims (Premazzi 2016) and support specific campaigns.

Among them, in Turin, since 2012 they have been running the project *Equilibri d'Oriente*[3] hosted by the local foundation *Circolo dei Lettori*: meetings and public reading of books and poems by authors from the countries of origin of their parents or from Muslim countries, to promote knowledge and awareness and show diversities and similarities of the different cultures and countries. Also, another local practice started in Turin in 2014 that has been adopted also by other cities in Italy has been the "Iftar street": a public gathering during the month of Ramadan where a local mosque offers the dinner (*Iftar*) to the local community inviting also non-Muslims and the local religious leaders to join and share and promoting in this way knowledge and awareness regarding Muslim practices and interreligious dialogue (Premazzi 2016). This activity is also at the origin of the initiative named as *Moschee Aperte* (Open Mosques) that has been officially adopted at the national level as a tool to foster mutual knowledge and overcome the fear of the unknown that Islam sometimes carries with it also due, as highlighted before, to the narratives conveyed by the media.

The role of the second generation has been recognized by the Italian institutions and a reference to the second generations is also contained in the *Patto Nazionale per un Islam Italiano* (National Pact for an Italian Islam)[4] signed in February 2017 by the Italian Minister of Interior and eleven Muslim associations. The document is part of the Italian national strategy to promote security against Islamic terrorism, but seeking also to meet the need of the Muslim organizations that signed the pact, to obtain official recognition, a sign of commitment from both sides, the government and the Islamic communities, towards the long-awaited

[3] See http://equilibridoriente.altervista.org/.

[4] See Patto Nazionale per un Islam Italiano, https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/patto_nazionale_per_un_islam_italiano_1.2.2017.pdf.

agreement (*Intesa*). The prevention of the terrorist threat and the fight against Islamophobia (or, rather, the culture of suspect that generates it) were, therefore, the ground on which the agreement was built, an agreement that, for the first time and unlike previous initiatives (e.g. the *Carta dei Valori della Cittadinanza e dell'Integrazione*—Chart of Citizenship Values and Integration[5]), envisages not only a commitment requested to the communities, but also of the Ministry itself. The pact is thus configured as a mutual recognition of values and activities already established by the Islamic communities. In the final part of the pact (art. 9), an explicit reference is made to the planning of "one or more meetings of national and public relevance between the institutions and the young Muslims" recognizing their importance for the future of the Italian Islam and the dialogue with the national institutions (Premazzi 2017, 2018). The pact, however, also brings with it the risk for Muslims and in particular for the young—"moderate", "European" "integrated"—Muslims that is never enough and they are always under surveillance and have to prove every time to be true believers and good citizens. If one of the objectives, repeatedly called by the former Minister of Interior, Hon. Marco Minniti, was to dissociate "immigration" and "terrorism" without, however, underestimating the link between lack of integration and security, the same term "lack of integration" was perceived by many already integrated Muslims—and in some cases also Italian citizens—as the justification to keep treating the Italian Muslims as "second-class citizens". Citizens who found themselves, once again, under special surveillance and still waiting to sign the official agreement with the Italian State (*Intesa*), that should provide them with full legal and social recognition in the country. The feeling of not being subject to the same and equal treatment as the other religions or religious minorities especially emerged from the public comments by the Muslim representatives to the paragraphs in the pact dedicated to the mandatory accessibility of the places of worship to non-Muslim visitors and the requested commitment to deliver or translate in Italian the Friday sermon. If it can be true that the requests arose from the need to counteract Islamophobia through knowledge, responding to the concerns of Italian society towards a religion

[5] See Carta dei Valori della Cittadinanza e dell'Integrazione, http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/documentazione/circolari/carta-dei-valori-della-cittadinanza-e-dellintegrazione.

that continues to be considered and perceived as mysterious, incomprehensible by language and threatening for the use made by terrorists and propaganda of the Islamic State, on the other hand it was perceived by the Muslims as a condition of specific attention and protection but also of surveillance and inequality compared to the other religions generating feelings of mistrust and stigmatization and triggering reactions of ethnic and religious victimization and separation (Premazzi 2018).

We Versus They, but Who Are They?

In the narratives of the media, since the 9/11, the Muslim second generations have been included in the community of "we", because they have been trying to assimilate and being like the local young Italians even against their families and traditional values. The media in many cases depicted them as "heroes" against old, barbaric and inhumane traditions. But the situation has changed after the proclamation of the Islamic State and the departure of foreign fighters, some of them young Muslims, second generations and apparently "fully integrated", from Europe and the West to Syria and Iraq.

Their stories and the narrative created by the media have had the effect to create a new selective ritual and to move the second generation in that homogeneous "they", "the others", whose choices and religion are dangerous and incompatible with "our" culture and society. But this process and these stories have also actually made visible what the media had before tried to cover: that the situation of the Muslim second generations was more complex even if in the media coverage they were considered included in the community of "we", integrated, the reality for many of them was to actually be and/or feel excluded, discriminated and without the same rights and opportunities.

This is particularly interesting if we consider Muslim women, as noted by Heather Hurlburt and Jacqueline O'Neill (2017, p. 1) in their article "We need to think harder about terrorism and gender. ISIS already is" because the narrative built around the young Muslim girl victim of traditional values and violence has also been used by ISIS itself but to empower the Muslim women and convince them to join the Islamic State: "the women were approached and asserted that Muslim women were viewed in the West solely as victims, supposedly oppressed by their own community and mocked by those outside them" and also that they could have never been really free of being themselves and wearing the hijab as an

independent individual choice and to escape the label of terrorist if they would have remained in the West. Daniel Koehler (2015) highlights how some of them have been also attracted by a sort of "jihadist emancipation", a response to the social and cultural isolation in which many Muslim girls lived in the West—from the possibility to travel and go abroad by themselves and to marry who they want without the consent of their families to the participation in police and surveillance activities for those who were part of the *Al-Khansaa* Brigade in Raqqa, Syria. For the men, ISIS appeal was more linked to masculinity, according to Christopher Daase of the *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt*. Their recruitment videos are very revealing in this sense. They are political appeals to take up the struggle against the West by any means, living a proper life as heroes.

From insignificant people, they transform themselves into heroes, from persons under surveillance or accused they become the unyielding judges of a society that they consider heretical and impious, from hated people to violent beings who terrorize the world, from being unknown to individuals whose actions are broadcasted on TV and newspapers, praised by other fighters and their peers on social networks. What ISIS offers was a status, a reputation and prestige, recognition within and outside of the local community, both in Syria and Iraq and in their European homelands through the publication and sharing of the images of the fighting on the Internet. Coolsaet (2015) significantly describes this factor as the prospect of going from zero to hero: meaning, belonging, fraternity, respect, status, adventure, heroism, martyrdom and personal success are all intertwined in a "successful" cause.

Lorenzo Vidino (2014) suggests that radicalization is a highly complex and individualized process and identifies structural (root causes) and individual motivations (personal factors) that sometimes interact with each other: political tensions and cultural cleavages, the shock of a life-changing event and the influence of a mentor. As shown by Vidino, motivations "range from a search for identity to anger over discrimination and relative economic deprivation" (2014, p. 28). The French anthropologist Dounia Bouzar (2015) also confirms: "Radicalization used to be limited to the poor and the uneducated. But the situation has changed today". Some European foreign fighters, in fact, hold college degrees and do not come from deprived neighbourhoods or face a precarious socio-economic and professional situations. Among the second generations, there are those who feel as if they have no future and are disappointed for not being recognized and accepted as equal citizens. However, the

foreign fighter phenomenon is more than a signal of failure of integration policies. As Roy (2015) highlights, those who joined ISIS shared the youth culture of their generation, they probably drank alcohol, smoked pot, towed girls and then, one day, decided to (re)convert to the religion of their fathers but in the Salafi version. This is because they rejected the culture of their parents and even the "Western" culture, which become the symbol of their self-hatred also because they perceive all of that as fake and superficial and their actual feeling is to be excluded and without the same rights as their native peers.

As already highlighted, the media play a role in promoting forms of exclusion and discrimination that can feed fundamentalism. Also, the construction of stereotypes and generalizations can lead, as a response to discrimination, racism and Islamophobia, perceived and experienced, to the formation of reactive identities and the risk of radicalization. In particular, many headlines after reporting the terrorist attacks around the world or coverage of stories of young Muslims, boys and girls, that became foreign fighters and left their countries to the Islamic State, demanded Italian Muslim communities to take a stand against terrorists and terrorism, to define what real Islam is. This seemed and was perceived by many Italian Muslims as a provocation and the necessity to defend themselves against the public accusation of complicity by collective responsibility or connivance with terrorist activities. Less publicity was given, however, to campaigns promoted in various Italian and European cities, where Muslims were, without being asked, explicitly distancing themselves, by word and deed, from terrorism and condemning religious extremism.

In doing so, the media play into the hands of terrorists, allowing them to become the representatives of Islam and Muslims in general and helping their strategic interest in propagating the belief that Islam and the West are engaged in a civilizational war (Courty and Rame 2016), the pre-9/11 idea of the clash of civilization. As the Islamic State itself outlined in its online magazine, *Dabiq*, in February 2015 (in Courty and Rame 2016, p. 1): Muslims in the West will soon find themselves between one of two choices because as the threat of further terrorist attacks looms, Western Muslims will be treated with increased suspicion and distrust, forcing them to: "…either apostatize [convert] … or [migrate] to the Islamic

State and thereby escape persecution from the crusader governments and citizens".

As Courty and Rame also pointed out, the Islamic State's divide-and-conquer strategy is crucial to its ability to replenish its ranks with foreign recruits. ISIS targets "disaffected and marginalised Western Muslims and invokes an Islamist narrative with promises of brotherhood, security and belonging. In turn, the Western news media indirectly advance the group's interests by repeatedly linking Muslim communities to terrorism and failing to meaningfully distinguish the Islamic faith from Islamist political ideology" (2016, p. 2). This kind of overly simplistic and sensationalist media coverage serves the Islamic State's objective to put Muslims and non-Muslims against one another (von Sikorski et al. 2017). Since summer 2014, with the proclamation of the Islamic State and the first decapitations of Western citizens, national media have in fact repeated the same mistake as they had made after 9/11, using double standards and generalizations and thereby helping to fuel fear and hostility. Articles in the Italian newspapers and magazines warned of the potential presence in Italy of what they described as "the terrorists next door", fomenting fear in the public opinion. The Pulitzer Prize winner, Glen Greenwald (2015, p. 3), commenting on coverage of January 2015, Paris attacks, notes that: "It's absolutely the really scary climate that has emerged in the wake of Paris, an extremely anti-Muslim strain of animosity that we've seen historically in the past and that is both ugly and really dangerous". ISIS and the series of attacks in Europe and the way they were covered by the media have therefore not played in favour of Muslims and the recognition of their presence in the public space and, consequently, of the enjoyment of rights, but have contributed to increasing prejudices, suspicions and forms of Islamophobia that, once again, amplified by the mass media, risk to determine or increase, especially among young people, the dynamics of rejection, social isolation, resentment that lead to adherence to extremist messages and radicalization processes in reaction to a situation that is no longer judged as bearable so to help ISIS to actually reach its objective.

A New Selection Ritual

As mentioned before, the "selective ritual" reinforces the typical selectivity of journalistic narratives, marking the boundary between those who can be included and who is excluded.

The second generations could be included if they show the values of youth, of beauty, of assimilation, but also of individual courage in promoting an innovative transnational and anti-radicalized Islam, even taking the stand against radicalized leaders, and in serving the community as community leaders and activists but also as policemen, security guards and soldiers, like Ahmed Merabet, the Muslim policeman killed by the Charlie Hebdo attackers. Here is where the media play a fundamental role in creating exclusion and inclusion, good and bad, "terrorists" or "heroes" and can help to overcome the clash of civilizations macro-frame showing the complexity of Islam and the complex and multi-faced approach and ways to believe, live and practice Islam of the second generations in Europe.

For the first generation, the cognitive frame within which the relationship with the host country is placed is that of immigration, which relies on the dialectics within a community that put its cultural-value roots in a place that has a plurality of origins but a single religious reference and sometimes an adverse context. For the second generations, the reference to immigration and diversity must be abandoned: the relationship is between citizens, residents who are committed to the common good of the community and the city where they live.

However, it is not only the type of relationship with the European and Italian context that distinguishes the way in which parents and children show and live their religious belonging and their social and political participation: young Muslims do not see Islam as the reproduction of the religious practices of the country of origin of their parents in a new context. As research by Della Porta and Bosi (2010) shows, the Islam of the second generations is shaped more as a way of life resulting from a choice that helps them to understand themselves and feel to be part of a community. Very often identification with Islam is felt more sharply than identification with a particular ethnic or national group. The *Giovani Musulmani d'Italia* (GMI) association is an example: it is a nationally based association, but Italy is the reference and is a religious organization, made up of young second generations whose parents have different national origins. Among them, in fact, there are Moroccans, Egyptians, Tunisians, as well as Somalis and Pakistanis. The association's goal is not just to claim rights for their own group, but actively to participate in the society. After having defined who they are, the association tries to answer the question what they can do in and for the society where they live.

Moreover, Internet and the social networks, in particular, have been an important channel of participation for these young people, especially due to their language and civic skills. These young people (or now young adults) are turning more into representatives, trying to promote the establishment of a European and Italian Islam free from the constraints of the traditions and the contexts and the influence of their parents' countries of origin.

Thanks to the Internet and social media what is happening is that the Muslim second generations are together creating a critical mass that can turn them into a globally influential force. The Internet has given space to marginalized voices within the community to express their views. With the Internet, they are also connected with the *ummah*, the worldwide community of Muslims that ideally transcends all barriers of ethnicity, race and nationality and can help them to build their own narratives and their own cultural frames. The Internet and social media have been used by ISIS for recruitment and for promoting their powerful narratives but they have also an incredible power to promote counter-narratives and empower the communities especially if the traditional media will be able to use it.

References

Alexander, J. C. (2006). *The Civil Sphere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barretta, P., & Milazzo, G. (2017). *Notizie da paura. Quinto rapporto Carta di Roma 2017*. Roma: Associazione Carta di Roma.

Bouzar, D. (2015). *La vie après Daech*. Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier.

Calvanese, E. (2011). *Media e immigrazione tra stereotipi e pregiudizi. La rappresentazione dello straniero nel racconto giornalistico*. Milan: Franco Angeli.

Coglievina, S., & Premazzi, V. (2015). L'Islam in Italia di fronte al fondamentalismo violento. In M. Diez & A. Plebani (Eds.), *La galassia fondamentalista tra jihad armato e partecipazione politica* (pp. 126–140). Padova: Marsilio.

Cohen, S. (1972). *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*. London: MacGibbon and Kee.

Coolsaet, R. (2015). *What Drives Europeans to Syria and to IS? Insights from the Belgian case* (Egmont Paper 75). Royal Institute for International Relations. http://bit.ly/2avChnI.

Cottle, S. (2006). Mediatized Rituals: Beyond Manufacturing Consent. *Media, Culture and Society, 28*(3), 411–432.

Courty, A., & Rame, H. (2016). Why the Media Needs to Be More Responsible for How It Links Islam and Islamist Terrorism. *The Conversation*, October

1, 2018. https://theconversation.com/why-the-media-needs-to-be-more-responsible-for-how-it-links-islam-and-islamist-terrorism-103170.
Decimo, F., & Demaria, C. (2010). Che genere di straniere? Immagini, costrutti e sperimentazioni sul soggetto femminile altro. In L. Gariglio, A. Pogliano, & R. Zanini (Eds.), *Facce da straniero* (pp. 211–233). Milano: Bruno Mondadori.
Della Porta, D., & Bosi, L. (2010). *Young Muslims in Italy Parma and Verona*. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University and The Denmark School, CIR.
Demos & Pi. (2017). *Gli attentati di Parigi*. http://www.demos.it/2015/pdf/364620151120_attentatiparigi.pdf.
DG COMM. (2015). *Special Euro-Barometer 437, Discriminations in the EU in 2015*. http://data.europa.eu/88u/dataset/S2077_83_4_437_ENG.
Frisina, A. (2007). *Giovani Musulmani d'Italia*. Roma: Carocci.
Gariglio, L., Pogliano, A., & Zanini, R. (Eds.). (2010). *Facce da straniero*. Milano: Bruno Mondadori.
Giacalone, C. (2016). Islamophobia in Italy, National Report 2015. In E. Bayrakli & F. Hafez (Eds.), *European Islamophobia Report 2015* (pp. 295–320). SETA. https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2017/05/EIR_2016.pdf.
Greenwald, G. (2015). *Paris Attacks' Interview*. http://www.terrorism-research.com/blog/glenn-greenwald-paris-attacks/.
Hall, S., et al. (1978). *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Huntington, S. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York City: Simon & Schuster.
Hurlburt, H., & O'Neill, J. (2017, June 1). We Need to Think Harder About Terrorism and Gender. ISIS Already Is. *Vox*. https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/6/1/15722746/terrorism-gender-women-manchester-isis-counterterrorism.
ISIS. (2015, February). *Dabiq*.
Koehler, D. (2015, Winter). The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet. *Journal for Deradicalization, 15*(1), 116–134.
Maneri, M. (2001). Il panico morale come dispositivo di trasformazione dell'insicurezza. *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, 1*, 5–40.
Miles, R., & Brown, M. (2003). *Racism*. London: Routledge.
Morey, P., & Yaqin, A. (2011). *Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation After 9/11*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Peta, I. (2018). Media and Violence in Europe: The Case of Growing Islamophobia in Italy. In M. Demichelis (Ed.), *Religious Violence, Political Ends. Nationalism, Citizenship and Radicalizations in the Middle East and Europe* (pp. 173–188). Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag.

Pogliano, A. (2013, May 23–25). *Honour Crimes and the Civil Sphere. A Case Study of News Framing of Ethnic Minorities*. Paper presented to the conference Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism in European Media and Film, The University of Manchester.

Pogliano, A. (2015). L'omicidio di Sanaa Dafani. L'affermazione definitiva del template "Hina Saleem". *Questione d'immagine, la rappresentazione del sociale sui media*. http://www.questionedimmagine.org/argomento/immigrazione/religioni/lomicidio-di-sanaa-dafani-e-laffermazione-definitiva-del-template-hina-saleem/.

Pogliano, A., & Zanini, R. (2010). L'immaginario e le immagini degli immigrati. Un percorso qualitative. In L. Gariglio, A. Pogliano, & R. Zanini (Eds.), *Facce da straniero* (pp. 103–187). Milano: Bruno Mondadori.

Pogliano, A., & Premazzi, V. (2014). Lo spazio delle seconde generazioni: un'analisi critica dei rituali dei media. *Sociologia Italiana, 3,* 71–94.

Premazzi, V. (2016). Secolarizzazione e nuove forme di protagonismo nella seconda generazione musulmana in Italia. In G. Salmeri (Ed.), *Troppa religione o troppo poca?: Cristiani e musulmani alla prova della secolarizzazione*. Padova: Marsilio.

Premazzi, V. (2017). *Il Patto Nazionale per un Islam italiano: passi avanti e passi indietro nel dialogo con l'Islam*. Torino: FIERI. https://www.fieri.it/2017/02/09/il-patto-nazionale-per-un-islam-italiano-passi-avanti-e-indietro-nel-dialogo-con-lislam/.

Premazzi, V. (2018). Ius soli, Between Human Rights and Terrorism Prevention, the Italian Case. In M. Demichelis (Ed.), *Religious Violence, Political Ends: Nationalism, Citizenship and Radicalizations in the Middle East and Europe* (pp. 142–172). Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag.

Premazzi, V., & Ricucci, R. (2020). Faith, Identity and Practices: The Current Refugee Crisis Challenges Religious Diversity in Europe. In J. Serrano Cornelio, F. Gauthier, T. Martikainen, & L. Woodhead (Eds.), *Routledge International Handbook of Religion in Global Society*. Boston: Center for Global Christianity & Mission.

Ricucci, R. (2015). *Cittadini senza cittadinanza. Immigrati, seconde e altre generazioni: pratiche quotidiane tra inclusione ed estraneità*. Torino: Edizioni SEB27.

Roy, O. (2015, November 24). Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste. *Le Monde*. http://bit.ly/1R2WLmt.

Salih, R. (2004). The Backward and the New: National, Transnational and Post-National Islam in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30*(5), 995–1011.

Siino, G. A., & Levantino, N. (2015). Islamophobia in Italy, National Report 2015. In E. Bayrakli & F. Hafez (Eds.), *European Islamophobia Report*

2015 (pp. 265–292). SETA. https://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/reports/2015/en/EIR_2015.pdf.

Ter Wal, J. (2001). Italy. In Id. (Ed.), *Racism and Cultural Diversity in the Media* (pp. 239–272). Darby: Diane Publishing.

Vidino, L. (2014). *Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Radicalization Dynamics*. Milano: Ispi. https://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/vidino-eng.pdf.

von Sikorski, C., Schmuck, D., Matthes, J., & Binder, A. (2017). "Muslims Are Not Terrorists": Islamic State Coverage, Journalistic Differentiation Between Terrorism and Islam, Fear Reactions, and Attitudes Toward Muslims. *Mass Communication and Society, 20*(6), 825–848.